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Introduction
The software industry as an exemplary case of the 
functioning of the Russian market economy
If Russia has indeed ‘become a market economy’ as Anders Åslund 
claimed already in 1995, what are the roles of the social,  cultural and 
moral aspects of this economy and how does it function at the level of 
individual actors and their personal relations? In more concrete terms: 
what kinds of resources are transmitted through the personal networks 
of Russian business managers and directors, and which mechanisms 
govern this transmission?
This book searches for answers to these questions by contesting the 
separation of the economy from the social world and by setting the 
interactions of real people in their everyday economic activities at 
the center of inquiry (Swedberg and Granovetter 2001). The investiga-
tion will be accomplished through the analysis of interviews and an 
online survey conducted among specialists, managers, directors and 
company owners of St. Petersburg software development companies 
between 2003 and 2006.
The software industry is a particularly indicative test case through 
which to investigate the Russian market economy and its network-
ing practices.1 A study of one of the most sophisticated and modern 
(though still relatively modest in terms of turnover and profit) parts 
of the Russian economy should better reveal the actual functioning of 
the markets than, say, a study of the state-controlled energy sector. The 
Russian software industry is also relatively less influenced by the ‘Soviet 
heritage’ than many other branches of the Russian economy: though its 
roots are in the scientific and technical knowledge already accumulated 
in the Soviet era and imperial Russia, the first companies emerged only 
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during perestroika and as a rule did not inherit outdated Soviet produc-
tion facilities or management structures.
This book contributes to the literature on post-Soviet transition, 
affording a rarely available micro-level view on the new Russian knowl-
edge-based economy. In addition, it has both economic and political 
importance. From the viewpoint of the development of the Russian 
economy, this book’s significance lies in pointing out perspectives on 
economic diversification in terms of mathematical-technical expertise 
instead of on energy production and export. A developed software sector 
is not only essential for the modernization of all fields of the economy; 
the examples of Ireland and India suggest that it may also function 
as a major source of revenue in a national economy (Terekhov 2003). 
Increasing global connections in the field of information technology 
may also encourage the adoption of international business practices, for 
example through ISO and CMM quality certification (Feakins 2007).
Finding the Russian economy a way out of the ‘resource curse’ is all 
the more necessary since the economic policy based on energy produc-
tion has had its time in the sun and the growth in output of basic energy 
commodities is likely to remain low (Sutela 2008a, b). This necessity has 
not gone unnoticed by the Russian leadership: both Vladimir Putin and 
Dmitry Medvedev have on several occasions emphasized the need to 
diversify the Russian economy.2 The latter, for example, has criticized 
harshly the backwardness of the Russian economy and its anchorage 
in the Soviet past, naming information technology as one of the five 
new priority areas of the economy. When announcing the creation of 
a presidential commission for the modernization and technological 
development of Russia’s economy in May 2009, Medvedev openly 
admitted that none of the precedent measures taken to boost innova-
tion-based high-tech economy in the 2000s, such as industrial parks, 
technology transfer centers, special economic zones or Russian venture 
companies, had yielded serious results but rather existed ‘only on paper’ 
(Butrin and Granik 2009). He returned to the economic moderniza-
tion theme in his opening address for the commission in June, in his 
widely debated article ‘Go, Russia!’ in September, and in his address to 
the Federal Assembly in December of the same year (Medvedev 2009a, 
b, c).3
From the viewpoint of politics, the investments by and collaboration 
with foreign IT firms in Russia as well as the Russian IT entrepreneurs’ 
activities may open up the Russian economy and create preconditions 
for a new kind of state–business relationship, currently characterized by 
the dominance of the state over the economy (Yakovlev 2006). More 
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importantly, modern information and communications technology 
plays an increasingly important role for the horizontal communication 
among civil society actors, substituting for the biased coverage of the 
Russian mainstream media (Lonkila 2008).
The role of social networks in the Soviet and Russian 
economy and society
Thanks primarily to Alena Ledeneva’s (1998) work on blat – a Soviet sys-
tem of using connections to obtain private gain from state resources – 
there is agreement among researchers on the central role social net-
works played in Soviet society.4 In order to get by in daily life, most 
Soviet citizens had to pull strings, for example, to get decent meat, a car, 
an apartment or exemption from army service. 
However, the use of social networks for purposes other than blat 
in the Soviet Union is a clearly under-researched topic. Blat practices 
certainly did not cover all the instances of mutual favors or helping 
others out in Soviet daily life. Moreover, even the actual prevalence of 
blat in the Soviet Union is difficult to estimate in retrospect. As noted 
by Anna-Maria Salmi, it is not known how many Soviet citizens actu-
ally obtained, say, their apartment or car by using blat (Salmi 2006, 
2009).5
The critical notes by Salmi also warn against hasty answers to the 
question ‘What happened to the use of connections when the Soviet 
Union collapsed?’ If we lack reliable empirical data on the prevalence of 
these connections in the Soviet Union, the estimates of the changes in 
post-Soviet Russia in these ties will be educated guesses at best.
Despite the problems, a natural expectation would seem to be that 
the privatizing of the economy and the spread of market relations 
would have torn apart old Soviet era practices such as blat: most goods 
which were in short supply in the Soviet Union are now freely available 
on the market, there are less state property, goods or services to use in 
private exchanges, and the market costs of these exchanges are clearly 
visible to all participants (Ledeneva 1998; for a closer look at blat and 
its transformation in post-Soviet Russia see Chapter 4).
However, a growing body of research on the use of social networks 
in the post-Soviet era suggests that connections still play an important 
role in Russian society, for example, in health care (Salmi 2003; Rivkin-
Fish 1997, 2005), education (Lonkila 1998), civil society and collective 
action (Alapuro 2001; Alapuro and Lonkila 2000; Gibson 2001) and 
many other fields of life (Salmi 2006; Ledeneva 2009).6 Though, because 
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of the fading of the Soviet shortage economy, there is less need to pull 
strings to get access to goods and services, connections are still needed – 
often in conjunction with money – to ensure their quality.
The results of these studies are lent further support by an all-Russian 
survey on the non-market forms of exchanges of help in Russian fami-
lies’ daily life conducted by the Russian Academy of Sciences in 2000 
and 2006. The study revealed that the number of Russian families get-
ting various types of help from their personal networks had increased in 
regard to almost all types of help. The study also found that the types 
of help obtained from one’s social networks varied according both to 
the local context (help being more prevalent in growth regions such 
as Moscow and St. Petersburg) and to the socioeconomic level of the 
families. The poor families used their social ties mainly to survive in 
daily life, whereas the ‘multifunctional’ networks of the more well-to-do 
families also helped them in improving their situation. The results of 
the study suggest that social networks are not only the result of social 
stratification but also reproduce this stratification.7
Similarly, a face-to-face survey conducted in 313 Moscow families in 
2005–6 about their engagement in non-market work found that the 
vast majority of the households studied participated in non-market 
economic practices, including the subsistence economy, non-monetized 
exchange with friends, neighbors and kin and informal monetary 
exchange (Williams and Round 2007).8
Networks are not only used, however, for Russian households’ subsist-
ence, but to solve a wide variety of daily life problems in various arenas 
and fields of life. Expanding the area surveyed outside the household 
income formation allows us to conclude that the connections still have 
an important role in post-Soviet Russian society.
In line with the findings regarding the role of networks in Russian 
society, the studies of networks in the Russian economy have confirmed 
their role across a variety of economic contexts such as labor markets 
(Clarke and Kabalina 2000; Yakubovich and Kozina 2000; Yakubovich 
2005), banking (Guseva and Rona-Tass 2001) and entrepreneurship and 
firm performance (Aidis et al. 2008; Shmulyar Gréen 2009; Batjargal 
2003, 2005a, b, 2007; Rogers 2006).9
Because of the wide range of study areas, different theoretical back-
grounds, a range of methods mostly not designed for network research 
and often-metaphorical notions of networks, this literature does not 
produce coherent or accumulating results. These difficulties notwith-
standing, the main conclusion points to the continuing and central 
importance of social networks in Russian economic life.10
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The significance of networks in the Russian economy is often 
related to lacking or incomplete market institutions such as the bank-
ing system, the distrust of most societal institutions penetrating 
Russian society11 and the patterns of behavior inherited from the Soviet 
era. In Russian daily life several aspects that are taken for granted in 
‘Western countries’12 may turn out to become problematic; and in 
solving these problems, one is inclined to turn to his/her social ties for 
help.13
Despite the wealth of research on social networks in the Russian 
economy, there is still a remarkable lack of empirical studies describing 
in detail how these networks function in practice at the grassroots level. 
How do the network ties emerge and form? What kinds of resources 
flow through these ties? Which mechanisms govern the transmission of 
resources? These are the questions this book seeks to answer by paying 
attention not only to social, but also cultural and moral aspects of the 
Russian economy.
Incorporating cultural and moral aspects into studies of 
networks in the Russian economy
Studies of social networks in the Russian economy seem to suffer 
from a double bias: it is as if any use of social networks in Russia has 
a somewhat dubious or instrumental character, and the networks of 
economic life are even more contaminated by pervasive instrumental-
ism and illegal or immoral behavior. Consequently, other aspects of the 
social networks, such as friendship or non-instrumental mutual help, 
have received much less attention (but see Kharkhordin 2005: 132–54, 
2009).
At least two reasons for this state of affairs can be distinguished. 
First, due to the vagueness or complete lack of definition of the notion 
of ‘network’, the term may be used to refer to anything from formal 
interorganizational ties to social interaction in general (Salmi 2006). 
Second, social networks are often confused with blat and post-Soviet 
informal practices despite the fact that not all informal practices are 
effectuated through social networks, and networks also have other, non-
instrumental functions such as sociability.
This book seeks to overcome these problems by taking the notion 
of personal network both as the theoretical point of departure and 
methodological tool of the study, enabling an analysis of networks 
as an alternative means to markets for coordinating economic 
activities. This analysis will reveal the tensions resulting from the 
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sometimes-contradictory requirements of personal ties and markets and 
illustrate the intertwining of social, cultural and moral aspects in the 
Russian economy.
This book focuses, instead of on illegal or immoral practices, on more 
supportive and mundane aspects of favors, ranging from a hint about a 
good job from a friend to the help of a lawyer acquaintance in writing 
a contract or the advice of an old schoolmate to locate a key person in 
a client organization. Without these kinds of favors – mostly invisible 
in any statistics – neither the Russian nor any other economy would 
work properly. It is essential to note that these favors are often quicker, 
cheaper and more effective than alternative, formal ways of action, 
and they do not necessarily have to have either an illegal or immoral 
character. At the same time, they may have important consequences 
for the economy and society as a whole, as is the case in job searches, 
for example.14
Thus this study complements previous research on economic net-
works and informal practices, particularly Alena Ledeneva’s important 
work on the economy and society of the Soviet Union and post-Soviet 
Russia, including such works as Russia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, 
Networking and Informal Exchange (Ledeneva 1998) and How Russia 
Really Works: The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and 
Business (Ledeneva 2006), but differs from Ledeneva’s research in several 
respects.
First, Ledeneva’s (1998) examples concern the daily life problems of 
ordinary people and various fields of business in both the Soviet Union 
and post-Soviet Russia, whereas this book deals solely with the most 
modern part of the post-Soviet Russian economy. Second, this study 
focuses on personal networks instead of informal practices. Third, 
the material of Ledeneva’s latest book (2006) describes the situation 
mainly in the 1990s, ending with her study of informal practices up 
to the year 2003. The online survey data of this book were collected 
in 2004 (describing the situation in 2003), but the interviews cover 
the years 2003–6, with updates to the present. Fourth, this study deals 
with ‘the economy of favors’ in post-Soviet Russia, which differs from 
blat exchanges in two important ways: the mutual favors analyzed 
in this book do not have to have the dubious character that marked 
blat exchanges, nor is state property or access to it as a rule used as a 
medium of exchange. Finally, this book shows that the Russian market 
economy is not only embedded in social networks but also that the 
actors in the networks justify their economically relevant transactions 
by referring to moral principles.
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Structure of the book
The next chapter describes the theoretical idea, methods and data of 
the study. It introduces the notion of personal network to the reader 
and analyzes the advantages of the notion in the studies of the Russian 
economy and society. The chapter also describes in detail the use of the 
researchers’ own personal ties when trying to get interviews from the 
busy Russian IT professionals. This description is not only of a method-
ological nature, however, since it simultaneously illustrates the central 
theme of this book: the importance of personal network ties in solving 
problems in post-Soviet Russia.
Chapter 3 contextualizes the network data on Russian managers’ 
and directors’ networks analyzed in this book. The chapter begins with 
a case description of the birth and development of the St. Petersburg 
software company ‘Arcadia’. This case is then placed in a larger context 
by a portrayal of the evolution of the IT field in the Soviet Union and 
post-Soviet Russia.
Though the IT sector has been less affected by the Soviet past than 
many other fields of Russian industry, this past is still in many ways 
present in today’s IT sector. Chapter 4 discusses both the constraining 
and enabling aspects of this ‘Soviet legacy’. It offers examples of the 
gradual transformation of informal Soviet practices, such as blat (pull-
ing strings), to the transition-era barter and present-day otkat, a new and 
widespread form of corruption.
Social networks do not grow haphazardly; rather, new acquaint-
ances are usually made in social contexts and milieus where people 
are brought together by some common purpose and are likely to have 
regular or prolonged interaction. Chapter 5 studies the social milieus 
and ‘interaction foci’ important to personal network growth among 
St. Petersburg IT professionals. They include schools with a spe-
cial emphasis on mathematics, the several technical universities of 
St. Petersburg, virtual milieus such as Russian weblogs and social net-
working web sites, the association of Russian software developers and 
the special importance and social functions of birthdays in the Russian 
economy and society.
Chapter 6 describes in detail the contents of the network exchanges, 
illustrated by quotes from our respondents’ interviews. These exchanges 
transmit various kinds of information and other important economic 
resources, such as jobs, advice and concrete help.
While the previous chapter dealt with the contents of the Russian 
managers’ informal transactions, Chapter 7 analyzes the social 
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mechanisms governing these exchanges. The chapter focuses on three 
such mechanisms: reciprocal obligations, the use of brokers in resource 
transmission and evaluation and the mixing of professional and personal 
spheres of life. In discussing reciprocal obligations, the chapter shows – 
drawing from the justification theory developed by Luc Boltanski and 
Laurent Thévenot ([1991] 2006) − how the economically relevant 
exchanges between Russian IT professionals are related to and sup-
ported by the moral resources used to justify these exchanges.
Chapter 8 connects the micro-level analysis of preceding chapters to 
an assessment of the nature of the emerging new Russian capitalism, 
building on the results of an online network survey conducted among 
St. Petersburg IT professionals in 2004. Having established the impor-
tance of personal network ties in the Russian economy and society, this 
chapter examines the extent to which this significance is indicative of 
the emergence of the ‘new spirit of capitalism’, which values constant 
networking, projects and mobility (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005).
The study’s conclusions are offered in Chapter 9.
